If you are standing up a new secure file transfer service from scratch and both protocols are on the table, pick SFTP. It is one channel, one port, one firewall rule, and one set of credentials. It tunnels everything over SSH, and SSH is a protocol the security team already understands. We build an SFTP server. We are not shy about saying SFTP is the default answer.
But "the default answer" and "the only answer" are different statements. There are real production environments where FTPS - FTP wrapped in TLS, defined in RFC 4217 - is the protocol you should pick. This post is about those environments: what makes them different, why SFTP does not fit, and what the configuration actually looks like when you turn on FTPS alongside SFTP on the same server.
A quick primer: what separates the two
SFTP and FTPS solve the same problem - encrypted file transfer - but they are architecturally different protocols that happen to have similar names.
SFTP is a subsystem of SSH. The client opens one TCP connection to port 22, negotiates an SSH session (key exchange, host-key verification, user authentication), and then runs the SFTP binary protocol inside that session. One port, one connection, one encryption layer. The entire conversation - commands, responses, file data - travels through that single tunnel.
FTPS is FTP (RFC 959) with TLS bolted on. FTP has always used two channels: a control channel for commands (RETR, STOR, LIST) and a separate data channel for the actual bytes. FTPS wraps both channels in TLS, but they remain separate TCP connections with separate TLS sessions. That dual-channel design is the source of nearly every operational difference between the two protocols.
There are two FTPS modes:
- Explicit FTPS (the standard). The client connects to port 21 in plaintext, sends
AUTH TLS, and the server upgrades the control channel to TLS. The client then issuesPBSZ 0andPROT Pto request that data connections also be TLS-protected. This is what RFC 4217 defines. - Implicit FTPS (the legacy model). The client connects to port 990 and TLS negotiation starts immediately - no
AUTHcommand. This predates RFC 4217 and is technically deprecated, but it is widely supported and still specified by some trading partners.
Scenario 1: Your trading partner only speaks FTP
This is the most common reason FTPS gets turned on. You are not choosing a protocol for greenfield; you are connecting to a counterparty that already has an FTP gateway. Banks, insurance clearinghouses, government agencies, logistics providers - many of them have FTP infrastructure that was deployed a decade ago and is not being replaced. The connection spec they hand you says "FTP over TLS, port 990, implicit mode, passive data ports 50000-50100." That is the spec. Your choices are to meet it or to not do business.
This scenario is not about FTPS being better. It is about FTPS being required. You need a server that can speak the protocol, use the same user accounts and audit trail you already have, and not require a separate installation. In Stylus SFTP Server, that means switching on the FTP listener, which the configuration already contains with <enabled>false</enabled>, setting it up, and restarting:
<listeners>
<listener type="sftp">
<port>22</port>
</listener>
<listener type="ftp">
<enabled>true</enabled>
<port>990</port>
<implicit-ssl>true</implicit-ssl>
<keystore-path>conf/ftpserver.p12</keystore-path>
<keystore-password>yourpassword</keystore-password>
<passive-ports-start>50000</passive-ports-start>
<passive-ports-end>50100</passive-ports-end>
</listener>
</listeners>
Both listeners share the same user database, the same home directories, the same audit sinks, and the same quota enforcement. A file uploaded over FTPS shows up in the same audit trail as a file uploaded over SFTP. The user account is the same account. The home directory is the same directory. You are not running two servers; you are running one server with two network frontends.
Scenario 2: Regulatory submission gateways
Some regulators and industry bodies mandate a specific protocol for file submissions. The U.S. Federal Reserve's FedLine system, certain EU financial reporting gateways, and multiple healthcare clearinghouses specify FTPS with explicit TLS as their inbound submission protocol. They chose it because FTP was the incumbent when they built the gateway, TLS encryption satisfied their compliance requirements, and the operational investment in replacing it with SSH-based infrastructure is not justified when the existing gateway works.
When the submission spec says "explicit FTPS on port 21, TLS 1.2 or higher, PROT P required," there is no argument to make. You configure explicit TLS:
<listener type="ftp">
<enabled>true</enabled>
<port>21</port>
<explicit-ssl>true</explicit-ssl>
<ssl-protocols>TLSv1.2,TLSv1.3</ssl-protocols>
<keystore-path>conf/ftpserver.p12</keystore-path>
<keystore-password>yourpassword</keystore-password>
<passive-ports-start>50000</passive-ports-start>
<passive-ports-end>50100</passive-ports-end>
</listener>
The <ssl-protocols> element pins the minimum TLS version. If a client tries to negotiate TLS 1.1 or lower, the handshake fails. This is not optional for regulatory contexts - PCI DSS, for example, has prohibited TLS 1.0 since June 2018 and strongly discourages TLS 1.1.
Scenario 3: The firewall team wants to inspect TLS
SSH is opaque to network inspection devices. Once the SSH handshake completes, the entire conversation - authentication, commands, file content - is inside an encrypted tunnel that a middlebox cannot decrypt without the host key. Some security teams consider this a feature. Others consider it a gap.
TLS is different. Enterprise TLS inspection appliances (Palo Alto, Zscaler, F5) can terminate and re-encrypt TLS connections using a corporate root CA. With FTPS, the firewall can inspect the control channel (seeing which commands are issued, which files are transferred) and optionally the data channel, while still presenting a valid TLS certificate to the client. The firewall team gets visibility; the transfer stays encrypted end-to-end from the client's perspective.
SSH-based inspection exists but is far less common, less mature, and more operationally expensive to deploy. If your security policy requires protocol-level inspection of file transfers, FTPS may be the path of least resistance.
Scenario 4: The client software only speaks FTP
Windows Explorer has native FTP support built in. Plenty of legacy batch scripts call ftp.exe. Mainframe JCL jobs use FTP for file distribution. Industrial control systems, point-of-sale terminals, and embedded devices often have an FTP client but no SSH client.
For these environments, the question is not "which protocol is better?" but "which protocol does the device support?" If the answer is FTP, you enable the FTP listener with TLS and move on.
What FTPS does not give you
There is a reason SFTP is the default. FTPS trades simplicity for compatibility, and you should know what you give up.
No public-key authentication
FTPS authenticates with username and password, sent over the TLS-encrypted control channel. There is no mechanism for public-key authentication. If your security model depends on key-based auth (no passwords on the wire, key rotation policies, certificate-based identity), FTPS cannot provide it. SFTP can.
No MFA
SSH supports keyboard-interactive authentication, which is the mechanism SFTP servers use to prompt for a TOTP code after the password. FTP has no equivalent. Stylus SFTP Server supports TOTP multi-factor authentication on the SFTP listener and the Web Portal, but the FTP/FTPS listener handles password authentication only.
Two channels, two firewall rules, and NAT headaches
The dual-channel architecture of FTP means the firewall needs to allow the control port (21 or 990) and the passive data port range. In the configuration above, that is ports 50000 through 50100 - 101 additional firewall rules. If the server is behind a NAT device, you also need the <passive-external-address> element to advertise the public IP in PASV responses, because the server's internal IP is meaningless to the client on the other side of the NAT.
SFTP has none of this. One port, one rule, and NAT just works because there is only one TCP connection.
No post-quantum key exchange
The SSH protocol supports hybrid key exchange with ML-KEM (the post-quantum algorithm standardized by NIST in 2024). Stylus SFTP Server negotiates ML-KEM on the SFTP listener when both client and server support it. TLS 1.3 has post-quantum cipher suites in draft, but they are not yet widely deployed in the FTP ecosystem. If "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks are in your threat model, SFTP gives you a concrete answer today.
Running both from one server
The practical answer for most organizations is not "SFTP or FTPS" but "SFTP and FTPS." You run SFTP as the primary protocol for partners and systems that support it. You run FTPS for the legacy gateways, the regulatory submissions, and the embedded devices that need it. Both protocols share the same users, the same filesystem, the same audit trail, and the same admin console. One installation, one configuration file, one set of operational procedures.
The protocol comparison table on our features page lays out what is shared and what differs between the two listeners. Shared: user database, per-user quotas, audit trail, home directories, access control. Differs: port, encryption model, authentication methods (public key and MFA are SFTP-only), and post-quantum support.
The decision in one paragraph
Choose SFTP when you can. It is simpler to operate, stronger on authentication, firewall-friendly, and already has post-quantum key exchange. Choose FTPS when the counterparty, the regulator, or the device requires it. Do not choose FTPS because it sounds more secure than FTP - that is true, but SFTP is also more secure than FTP, and it is simpler to get right. The only honest reason to pick FTPS over SFTP is that something in your environment needs FTP specifically, and TLS makes it acceptable.
A server that supports both protocols lets you make that decision per partner instead of per infrastructure. The SFTP listener handles the partners who can. The FTPS listener handles the ones who cannot. The audit trail does not care which protocol delivered the file.